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An Empir ica l  Study  of  Sectora l -Level  
Capi ta l  Investments  in  New Zealand  
W. Razzak 1 
Abs t rac t  
[I extend the Glick and Rogoff (1995) aggregate time-series, empirical, intertemporal 
model of country-investment (and the current account) to a sectoral-level, and estimate it 
for New Zealand.  I fit the model to panel data of eleven industries from 1988-2009.  The 
sectoral-level investment growth is a function of lagged investment level, sector-specific 
TFP shocks, country-specific TFP shocks, and global TFP shocks.  The estimates seem 
robust to government spending shocks and Terms of Trade shocks.] 
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1  In t roduc t io n  
 
The consensus is that New Zealand has relatively low levels of capital investment and 
productivity (measured by GDP per hour worked) because TFP is low (Treasury 2008).
i
  
TFP accounts for the changes in output not caused by changes in labour and capital 
inputs. TFP growth represents the effect of technological change, efficiency 
improvements, and our inability to measure the contribution of all other inputs. This 
argument is consistent with a number of different growth models.
ii
   
 
Essentially, TFP might be the main explanatory variable for capital investments. Prescott 
(1997) shows that cross-country differences in savings rates – even after correcting the 
capital stock data to include intangible capital – explain only very small portions of the 
income differentials between countries.  A model with human capital also fails for similar 
reasons. TFP is the most important variable that can explain differences in cross-country 
income differences.   
 
Laabas and Razzak (2011) calibrated an aggregate semi-endogenous growth-accounting 
model that accounts for the quality of human capital. They found that three-quarters of 
New Zealand’s GDP per hour growth rate is attributed to TFP growth (not capital, labour, 
or human capital).  And, TFP explains one-half of the productivity growth in Australia.  But, 
at the firm level, lagged investments seem to explain all the variations of current 
investments.  Eberly et al. (2012) provide additional evidence for the Christiano et al. 
(2005) model of investment.   
 
Prescott (1997) emphasises that although the U.S. is the most productive nation in the 
world, it is not the most productive nation in all industries.  He shows that sector-level 
productivity differences are not explained by differences in the stock of capital, human 
capital, or useable knowledge.  
 
Intertemporal models in this literature are usually simulated because they do not have 
closed-form solutions.  Estimation might shed more light on the responsiveness of the 
sector-level investment growth to various shocks, which might vary across different 
industries.  We could measure the size of these responses; policy responses may be 
different for different industries.    
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This paper attempts to explain the behaviour of sector-level capital investment. I combine 
three different aspects of the investment literature in one.  First, I use an intertemporal 
model, where investment growth is a function of past investment’s level and productivity 
shocks; second I investigate investments at the sectoral level rather than the aggregate 
level; and finally I estimate the model rather than simulate it.  
 
To do so, I extend Glick and Rogoff (1995).  They follow Sachs (1981), Obstfeld (1986) 
and Frenkel and Razin (1987) who study the intertemporal effect of government spending 
and productivity shocks.iii Their model, however, is an aggregate empirical model – where 
the investment-growth rate is a function of the lagged investment level, a country-specific 
TFP shock, and a global TFP shock.  I extend this model to study the sectoral-level 
investments in New Zealand and introduce a third shock – and sector-specific TFP shock.  
In this version of the model, Sectoral-level capital investment growth rate depends on lag 
investment level, Sector-specific TFP shock, country-specific TFP shock, and a global 
TFP shock.  I also control for government spending shocks and Terms of Trade shocks 
(ToT). The former is assumed to be a pure aggregate demand shock as in Glick and 
Rogoff (1995) while the latter could be either a demand or a supply shock.  I do so 
because there is some evidence for the effect of ToT shocks on the real economy and 
optimal resource allocation (e.g., Hunt, 2009, Grimes, 2009).  Hunt (2009) uses the IMF 
macro model.  Grimes calibrate a general equilibrium model.  Both assume a two sector 
economy of tradable and non-tradable goods.  Cassino (2012) provides evidence that 
subjectively splitting real GDP into tradable and non-tradable goods might be misleading. 
For example, some clearly non-tradable goods such as housing have intermediate inputs, 
which are largely tradables.iv  My sectoral-level modelling and estimation method is 
consistent with Cassino (2012).      
 
The results confirm the positive association between the shallowness of capital 
investments and productivity shocks in New Zealand at the sectoral level.  I found that, on 
average, sector-specific TFP shocks have effects on sectoral-level investments, but the 
effects have different magnitudes for different industries.  On average, country-specific 
TFP shocks are more important for the sectoral-level investment growth and more 
statistically significant. Contemporaneous global TFP shocks have no effect on 
investments at the sectoral level, but there is a very strong lag effect.  On average, the 
response of the sectoral-level investment growth to these shocks is twice as large in 
magnitudes as to country-specific TFP shocks; it is also five times larger than the 
response to sectoral-specific TFP shocks.  And, lagged investment’s effect is very 
significant and varies across industries.  On average, both government spending and ToT 
shocks have positive effects on the sectoral -level investment growth.  However, there is 
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evidence that the latter affects investment growth for some industries with a lag between 
one and two years.   
 
The paper is organized as follows. Next, we introduce the model.  Section 3 includes the 
description of the data. Section 4 includes the estimation and the analysis of the results.  
Section 5 concludes and provides a short policy discussion.  
2  The  Mode l  
2.1  Output  Supp ly  
 
The representative agent supplies labour inelastically so that the production function is 
given by: 
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Where tY is output, tK is the stock of capital, the term tt KI /
2
captures the adjustment 
costs in changing capital stock over time, ctA is a  country-specific TFP shock, where the 
subscript c denotes country and t is a time index.  The stock of capital evolves according 
to: 
 
ttt IKK 1  .
v     (2) 
 
The representative firm chooses an optimal path for investment tI to maximize the present 
discounted value of future profits, which is discounted at the world interest rate.
vi
  Glick 
and Rogoff (1995) use solution technologies found in Abel and Blanachard (1986), 
Shapiro (1986), and Meese (1980) to solve this optimisation problem. They take linear 
approximation to the first-order conditions, which gives: 
 
ctttt AKIY 321   .
vii      (3) 
 
The parameters 01   because of the adjustment costs mentioned earlier, and 
0; 32   
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And 
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In the above equation, the coefficients are 10 1   , 0 , and 10   . The 
expectation operator is E taken at time t .  The first term captures the effects of lagged 
investment and the second term captures the impact of revision in expectations about the 
future path of productivity.   
 
Let’s focus on deriving the investment empirical equation first.  Glick and Rogoff (1995) 
assume that the country-specific exogenous TFP shock ctA follows a first-order 
autoregressive process: 
 
ttcct AA   1, .     (5) 
 
The autoregressive parameter, 10   , but could be extended to a higher-order ARMA 
process.  They assumed that  =1 because it is consistent with the unit root’s test results, 
and for convenience too.  That says that country-specific TFP shocks are persistent and 
behave like a random-walk process.   Assuming  =1 and combining equation (4) and (5) 
yields: 
 
cttt AII   211  ,     (6) 
 
where the coefficient 2 is   0)1/(    . 
 
Subtracting 1tI from both sides results in the empirical equation for investment: 
 
cttt AII   211 )1(      (7) 
 
Both equations (6) and (7) are estimable equations.  The transformation of (6) to (7) does 
not affect the errors in (6).  Glick and Rogoff (1995) address this issue in details.  In any 
case, the estimation of the equations must undergo a careful testing of the residuals. 
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2.2  Globa l  TFP shocks  
 
To introduce global productivity shocks to the model, Glick and Rogoff (1995) replaced the 
production function in equation (1) with this: 
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That says country c  output is determined by its own capital stock, and its own country-
specific TFP shock and a global TFP shock with a subscript g .   
 
The empirical equation for investment above is replaced by: 
 
gtcttt AAII   3211 )1(     (9) 
 
Both TFP shocks follow random walks, 230   . The effect depends on the 
permanency of the shocks.  The coefficient 3 can be greater than 2 , if global TFP 
shocks are permanent while the country-specific TFP shocks are sufficiently transient.   
 
2.3  Sectora l -spec i f ic  TFP shocks  
 
Similarly, we re-derive the model for the sectoral level with sector-specific TFP shocks.  
Aggregate investment is the sum of the sectoral-level investments.   
 
Equation (1) becomes: 
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And equation (2) becomes: 
 
tititi IKK ,,1,  .     (11) 
 
The subscript i denotes sector.  The empirical investment equation would be: 
 
ititgtctitiit vAAAII    ,4,3,21,1 )1( (12) 
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The magnitude of the effect of the global TFP shock could be larger than both the 
country-specific TFP shock and the sector-specific TFP shock if the global TFP 
shock is permanent and the others are sufficiently transitory.  
3  Data  
The dependent variable in equation (12) is sectoral-level investment growth rate. Sectoral 
level investments data are from Statistics New Zealand. I use the real stock of capital by 
isector ( itK ). The data used in this exercise are net of depreciation, and exclude land.  
Log investment ( itI ) is itKlog , where is the difference operator and log is the natural 
logarithm (ln) . Sector-specific TFP growth data are from the Statistics New Zealand 
webpage.  They are annual TFP growth rate time series data. The sample sizes vary from 
one sector to another.  There are eleven industries with complete time series data from 
1988 to 2009, which I use in this paper: (1) Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing; (2) Mining; 
(3) Manufacturing; (4) Electricity, Water, and Waste Services; (5) Construction; (6) 
Wholesale Trade; (7) Retail Trade; (8) Accommodation and Food Services; (9) Transport, 
Postal, and Warehousing; (10) Information, Media, and  Telecom; and (11) Financial & 
Insurance Services. New Zealand’s TFP and the global TFP data are from the Conference 
Board Database. Figure 1 plots the sectoral-level log capital stocks; figure 2 plots 
investments and figure 3 plots the sectoral-level TFP growth rates. All the data used in the 
estimation of equation (12) are I(0). 
 
I examined different measures for New Zealand’s country-specific TFP growth shock. I 
used the Conference Board data; I computed the Solow residuals; and I took the average 
of the TFP growth over the eleven industries in the sample.viii  I used the latter because it 
seems to be a more sensible measure for the purpose of this paper than the other two 
aggregate measures because the aggregate figures include all the industries in the 
economy while we are only examining eleven industries. Also, the aggregate figures have 
more service sectors whose outputs are difficult to measure. Barsky and Sims (2011) 
study the role of news shocks. They find that the surprise movements of the Solow 
residuals, which are called adjusted TFP series, are largely temporary but the permanent 
component has a predictable component. Figure 4 plots the three measures. 
 
The global TFP growth shock represents the weighted-average of the shocks of the 
following countries: Australia, U.S., U.K., Germany, China, Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Korea, and India. The countries are chosen because they represent New 
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Zealand’s trading partners. The Conference Board estimates of TFP growth are residuals, 
which are computed by subtracting the sum of two-period average compensation share 
weighted input growth rates from the output growth rate. Log differences of level are used 
for growth rates, and hence TFP growth rates are Tornqvist indices. I tried two different 
weights: a GDP weighted-average of eleven-country TFP shocks and a trade-weighted 
average. I also tried to split them into Asian countries with or without Australia, the U.S. 
alone, and the Euro area.  Figure 5 plots the data. 
4  Es t imat i on  and  resu l t s  
 
I estimate equation (12) using Least-Squares estimator because lagged investment is a 
pre-determined variable and the shocks are exogenous. The regression is a sector-fixed-
effect panel regression, where T is 1988 to 2009 and N is eleven industries. The way this 
equation is derived does not involve differencing the fixed effect, and since T is greater 
than N, the least square estimator is appropriate. N is asymptotically identified as T goes 
to infinity.ix I also estimate White cross-section standard errors and a variance-covariance 
matrix, and correct for the number of degrees of freedom. Note, however, that there a 
measurement issue. The capital stock is understated because it does not include 
intangibles,x which might introduce a bias and inconsistency into the parameter estimates. 
This issue is beyond the scope of this paper. The problem cannot be resolved here; not 
until some new data are made available.xi  
 
Table 1 reports the initial results of estimating equation (12). The lagged investment effect 
is statistically significant.  The restriction 11   is estimated, and 1 , which is an estimate 
of the average across industries is, 0.57.  Thus, as shown in equation (6), an increase in 
lagged investment positively affects current investment’s level. This is consistent with the 
estimates reported in Glick and Rogoff (1995), and with Eberly et al. (2012) who provide 
evidence that the specification of investment adjustment costs proposed by Christiano et 
al. (2005) predicts the presence of a lagged investment effect and that a generalized 
version of that model is consistent with the behaviour of firm-level data. In Christiano et al. 
(2005), there is a second order adjustment cost assumption that leads to this lagged 
effect, and also gives rise to the role of expectations in investment decisions. The sector-
specific TFP shock has a coefficient of 0.06 and is significant.  So – on average – a one 
percent sector-specific TFP shock raises investments growth by only 0.06 percent. The 
average effect of the country-specific TFP shock on sectoral-level investments is 
significant and has a larger effect on the sectoral-level investment growth rate than sector-
specific shocks. On average, a 1 percent increase in New Zealand’s TFP growth rate 
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increases the sectoral-level investment growth by 0.15 percent. So on average, the 
industries are more sensitive to country-specific TFP shocks than to their own TFP 
shocks. And finally, on average, global TFP shocks have no effects on the growth rate of 
the sectoral-level investments in New Zealand.     
 
In table 2, I re-ran the same regression, but I assumed that the global TFP shock affect 
sectoral-level investment growth with a lag. The typical interpretation of the lagged global 
TFP shock is that these shocks have a significant delayed effect. However, the lagged 
values can also be proxy for expected or anticipated shocks under rational expectations 
and perfect foresights. In the standard real business cycle model with fully-flexible prices, 
an increase in the expected future productivity raises the real interest rate, but decreases 
the current level of investment given a value for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution 
in consumption. Olivei (1999) shows that under price stickiness, the effect of anticipated 
productivity increases current investment, and the real interest rate. Positive and 
significant lagged effects of productivity shocks on investment growth in New Zealand 
might be consistent with price stickiness. Evens (1992) showed that productivity shocks, 
which are measured as Solow residuals like our measure, are in fact highly correlated with 
money, interest rate, and government spending, so these shocks can be anticipated. He 
found that money, real interest rate and governments pending to Granger-cause 
productivity shocks measured by the Solow residuals. He also found that ¼ to ½ of the 
variations in these shocks can be attributable to aggregate demand fluctuations. Our 
finding seems to be highly consistent with such evidence.  
 
The time series is short, so one cannot possibly use formal methods to determine the lag 
structure. Instead, I began with an arbitrary general lag structure of four lags and tested 
backward using F test.  I found the global TFP shock to be only significant at a two-year 
lag.  A one percent positive global TFP shock increases investment growth at the sectoral-
level two years later by 0.31 percent. This effect is twice as large as the country-specific 
contemporaneous shock and at least five times as large as the sector-specific TFP shock.  
The effect of global TFP shocks on New Zealand indicates that (1) the global TFP shock 
maybe more permanent than the country-specific TFP shock and the sector-specific 
shock.  The time series are tested for unit root and the hypothesis is rejected in all of 
them.  However, the sector-specific TFP shock time series vary across industries, where 
the unit root hypothesis is also tested for the panel using commonly used panel unit root 
tests.  The hypothesis of unit root can be rejected.  (2) The fact that New Zealand is a 
small open economy and trades with the rest of the world.  I tried a similar estimation 
methodology with the country-specific TFP shock, but none of the lags were significant.  
The global TFP shock will be lagged twice in the remaining regressions and the country-
specific TFP shock will be contemporaneous. 
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Then, I re-ran the same regression, but I allowed for lagged investment and for the sector-
specific TFP shock to vary across industries. I estimate these two regressions separately 
to conserve on the degrees-of-freedom.   
 
In table 3, I allowed lagged investments to vary across industries. The sectoral-level TFP 
effect is 0.08 and the country-specific TFP shock magnitude is 0.22, slightly larger than 
before. The global TFP shock is 0.27, slightly smaller than before.  All these coefficients 
are statistically significant.  Most importantly, lagged investment is significant and varies 
across industries.  It is insignificant in three industries: Manufacturing, Wholesale Trade 
and Accommodation & Food Services. The coefficients vary significantly.  While 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery’s has a significant coefficient of 0.90, Transport, Postal, 
and Warehousing has a significant coefficient of nearly 1, Manufacturing has an 
insignificant coefficient of 0.18.  These results suggest that there is some idiosyncratic 
persistence at the sectoral level.  It remains a puzzle that lagged investment’s level does 
not affect current investment’s level in manufacturing.  
 
Table 4 reports the results, where the sector-specific TFP shock is allowed to vary across 
industries. There are no changes in the average estimates of lagged investment effect, 
the country-specific TFP shock, and the lagged global TFP shock. The sector-specific 
TFP shock also varies significantly across industries. The shock is insignificant in six 
industries, and has a negative effect in the Electricity, Water, and Waste Services and 
Transport, Postal, and Warehousing Services industries. These two negative signs are 
inconsistent with theory and may be allowing the parameters to vary with sectors 
introduced some misspecifications. It is significant in Construction (0.13), Retail Trade 
(0.37), and Information, Media, and Telecommunications Services. This confirms the 
average regression, which shows that the sectoral-level investment growth is not highly 
influenced by sector-specific TFP shocks.  
 
I control the regressions for two shocks: a country-specific government spending shock 
and a ToT shock. Glick-Rogoff (1995) treat government spending shocks as pure 
aggregate demand shocks under the assumptions that the utility function is separable in 
private and public consumptions and that government spending is financed by lump-sum 
taxes.  Government spending shocks, whether country-specific or global, can have effects 
on investment through the real interest rate.  In Barro (1981) who pioneered this literature, 
permanent government spending shocks do not alter the real interest rate; hence have no 
effect on real investments.  However, there are difficulties in estimating the effects of 
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government shocks on the real economy. The difficulties arise from disentangling many 
effects operating at the same time when measuring transitory government spending 
shocks.xii  
 
Government spending is defined as total central-government real expenditures less 
defence spending and interest payments. It does not include real transfer payments to 
households.  I tried this measure with and without government investment. Statistics New 
Zealand’s website reports the data, but they are incomplete time series and are, hence, 
unusable. Alternatively, I have two sources: one is the Haver Dataset, which has annual 
time series, and data compiled used in Claus et al. (2006) and used in Parkyn and Vehbi 
(forthcoming).xiii These data are based on (SNA) quarterly data. I convert the data to 
annual.   
 
Measuring government spending shocks is difficult. I tested the data for unit root using a 
variety of common statistical tests with different specifications and lags. The tests do not 
reject the unit root hypothesis. This result may be related to the weakness of the tests, but 
nevertheless the data have a trend. For this reason, I use the cyclical component of the 
HP filter as a measure of the government spending shock. Glick and Rogoff (1995) used 
the residuals from an IMA (1) model. The New Zealand data do not seem to fit this model 
well. Figure 6 plots my three different data for government spending shock. 
 
The results of estimating the model with government spending shocks are reported in 
table 5. The estimation strategy is to augment the regression in equation (12) with the 
above measures of the government spending shock, i.e., the HP cyclical component of 
government spending, using three different data: the Haver dataset, which report an 
aggregate government spending chain measure; the Claus et al. (2006) data excluding 
government investments, and the Claus et al. (2006) data including government 
investments.  If the coefficients were to be found statistically significant, I would fit another 
regression with the coefficients varying across industries. Unlike Glick and Rogoff (1995), 
I find some government spending effects, but the level of significance is measurement-
dependent. The measure of government spending shock based on the Haver dataset is 
insignificant, but those based on Claus et al. (2006) are. The cyclical component, which 
excludes government investments, is significant, but only at the 10 percent level. The 
inclusion of government investments in the measure of government spending increases 
the responsiveness of sectoral-level investment growth to transitory government spending 
shocks. The cyclical component of government spending plus government investments 
using Claus et al. (2006) data is statistical significant. On average, a 1 percent increase in 
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government spending (consumption plus investment) increases sectoral-level investment 
growth rate by 0.18 percent. Most importantly, the rest of our parameter estimates are 
robust to the inclusion of the government spending shock.   
 
Finally, I control for ToT shocks. One question is whether industries increase their 
investments in response to ToT shocks. Another question is whether the ToT shock 
affects tradable-goods sectors differently from non-tradable-goods sectors. The term of 
trade is the ratio of export to import prices. The data are from the Haver Dataset. They 
report quarterly data, which I averaged to obtain annual data. The ToT is for merchandise 
goods only. The ToT long quarterly data from 1957 display a mean-reverting 
behaviour. The unit root hypothesis is strongly rejected by a number of common statistical 
tests. However, the shorter annual sample from 1988 to 2009 exhibits trend and the unit 
root hypothesis cannot be rejected. That said, an ARMA (1,1) fits the data reasonably well 
with an MA coefficient 0.92 and an AR coefficient 0.37.  Given these results, I measure 
the ToT shock in two different ways: the residuals of an ARMA (1,1) model, and the 
cyclical component using an HP filter. The two measures are plotted in figure (7).  
Visually, the two measures look similar. I estimate the investment equation with ToT 
shocks, using both measures separately. Both measures of the shock turned out to be 
statistically insignificant. The results are in table 6.   
 
However, the relationship between government spending and ToT shocks on one side, 
and real investment growth on the other may not be contemporaneous. It depends on 
expectations. I re-estimate the investment equation with a lagged government spending 
and ToT shocks. On average, a ToT shock has a significant effect on the sectoral-level 
investment growth one year later. The rest of the coefficient estimates are unchanged, but 
the sectoral-level TFP shock is more significant. Given these results, I proceed to allow 
the government spending and the ToT shocks to vary across industries with different lags.  
I begin with a general short lag structure of four lags and test backwards using the F test.     
 
The results are reported in tables 7 and 8.  I run two separate regressions to conserve on 
the number of degrees-of-freedom.  In table 7, I report the lagged government spending 
shock effect on the industries. Most sectoral-level investment growth rates respond 
contemporaneously to a government spending shock, which includes government 
investments. But the results vary across industries. Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery 
reacts with a one year lag.  And so does the Mining sector. The response of Mining is 
quite sizable. There is a ¾ of a percent increase in investment growth for a one percent 
increase in government spending.  Manufacturing investment growth is adversely affected 
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two years after an increase in government spending, but the effect is only marginally 
significant, so manufacturing maybe irresponsive to such aggregate demand shock 
neither contemporaneously nor at any other lag. Construction and Wholesale Trade are 
unaffected. Electricity, Water and Waste Services investment growth rate is highly 
positively affected a year later; the increase in government spending increases investment 
growth a year later by more than ½ a percent. Construction and Wholesale Trade are 
unaffected by the shock at any lag. Retail Trade; Accommodation & Food Services; 
Transport, Postal, and Warehousing; and Information, Media & Telecommunication 
industries are positively and contemporaneously affected by the shock. The magnitudes of 
the increases in the growth rate of investments in response to the shock are large, 0.34, 
0.68, 0.37 and 0.36 respectively. The rest of the parameter estimates of the model are 
robust and retain their estimated values.    
 
Table 8 reports the estimated effects of lagged ToT shock on the industries investment 
growth rates. First, there is a ToT shock positive lagged effect, and more so than the 
government spending shock. Second, the lag length varies across industries. Third, not all 
industries respond to ToT shocks. Two of the industries whose investment growth 
responds to ToT shocks are tradable goods industries (Agriculture, Forestry, and 
Fisheries and Mining) and three services industries (Electricity, Water, and Waste 
Services; Transport, Postal, and Warehousing; and Finance and Insurance Services). 
Fourth, the response is sensitive to how the shock is measured. The HP cyclical 
component of the ToT shows no association with sectoral-level investment growth, except 
for Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries while the ARIMA (1,1) residuals do. 
 
Investment growth in the mining sector is only contemporaneously affected by ToT 
shocks, albeit with a very large coefficient.  A one percent increase in the ToT increases 
investment growth by 0.74 percent. Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries also respond 
within one year. Agriculture has a coefficient of 0.25. The services industries –such as 
Electricity, Water, and Waste Services and Transport, Postal, and Warehousing – respond 
significantly with a two-year lag, and coefficient magnitudes are relatively smaller than the 
rest. Finance and Insurance Services respond within one year with a very large coefficient 
of 0.50. For now obvious reasons, Information, Media, and Telecommunication services 
respond negatively to one-year lag ToT shocks. 
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5  Conc lus ions  and  Po l i cy  I ssues  
 
I estimated an intertemporal model for sectoral-level investment growth in New Zealand 
using a panel data of eleven industries over the period 1988 to 2009. The empirical model 
is an extension of an aggregate time-series, empirical, intertemporal model by Glick and 
Rogoff (1995).  Although the model differs from the real business cycle in some aspects, 
essentially three random total factor productivity shocks (TFP) drive investment growth at 
the sectoral level. There are, a sector-specific TFP shock, a country-specific TFP shock, 
and a global TFP shock.  In addition, the level of current investment at the sectoral-level is 
driven by lagged investment levels. While investment growth responds significantly and 
contemporaneously to sector-specific and country-specific TFP shocks, it only responds 
significantly to global TFP shocks with a two-year lag. The response of sectoral-level 
investment growth to global TFP shocks is twice as large as its response to country-
specific TFP shocks, and nearly five times as large as its response to the sector-specific 
TFP shocks. The lag effect implies that industries anticipate global TFP shocks, hence 
they react earlier. The responsiveness of sectoral-level investment growth to global TFP 
shocks rather than domestic TFP shocks (the country-specific TFP shock and the 
sectoral-specific TFP shock) reflects: (1) global TFP shocks may be more permanent 
while the sector-specific shocks are transitory.  (2) New Zealand is a small open economy.   
 
Government spending shocks, which are treated as a pure aggregate demand shocks, 
positively affect investment growth at the sectoral-level in New Zealand, but that depends 
on whether the measure of the shock includes public investments or not. It seems that 
government investments are important. Also, sectoral-level investment growth seems to 
react positively to ToT shocks. The reactions vary from one sector to another, and with 
different lags. While Mining responds contemporaneously and strongly, Agriculture, 
Forestry, and Fisheries respond with a one-year lag. Also, investment growth in three 
services industries (Wholesale Trade, Transport, Postal, and Warehousing, and Finance 
and Insurance Services) respond significantly with a one-year lag. Most importantly, the 
main estimates of the model are robust to the inclusion of the government spending shock 
and the ToT shock. 
 
To summarise, the main results of this study are that various random TFP shocks seem to 
have significant effects on current sectoral-level investment growth. The responsiveness 
of sectoral-level investments to TFP shocks vary across sectors. And, sectoral-level 
investment growth seems to increase when the economy as a whole is doing well and 
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more so in anticipation of global TFP shocks. Past investment levels have very strong and 
relatively varied effects on current investment.  
 
The result that the sectoral-level investment is driven by random productivity shocks 
presents a challenge to policy-making because random productivity shocks are beyond 
the direct control of policy. Global TFP shocks are strictly exogenous to New Zealand 
because New Zealand cannot exert any influence on them. Similarly, the model assumes 
that the country and sectoral TFP shocks to be exogenous too. However, the fact that 
lagged investment levels are very significant determinants of investment growth gives 
policy a role. Cross-sectoral variations of the responses of investment growth to various 
variables also suggest that a one-size-fits-all investment policy is not the right way to go. 
The government can change policies, e.g., fiscal or labour policies, such that it can 
influence private investment decisions.   
 
It should not be too contentious to argue that not all investments can lead to economic 
growth.  In endogenous growth models investments in knowledge (e.g., R&D and human 
capital are inputs into the innovation process that are required to make new goods and 
services) drive productivity growth. Under imperfect competition, there is an increasing-
returns-to-scale (externality effect), where doubling of output requires less than a doubling 
of inputs, which requires a non-diminishing marginal productivity of factor inputs.   
 
That being said, policy may be able to influence labour and capital productivity, and hence 
increase productive investments.  Simply put, the less input used to produce more output 
the higher TFP is. The government can either directly invest in private businesses or 
implement policies that influence the incentives of private businesses (either via price or 
regulatory mechanisms) to invest. There are arguments for and against direct government 
investments in private economic activities. However, investment is a process shrouded 
with uncertainty. That is evident in the large fluctuations of the data. There are risks 
involved, and some are hard to measure. The main concern is that in case the public 
investment fails to deliver output growth, taxpayer’s money would be wasted. 
Alternatively, it will be argued that policy should provide incentives for the private 
enterprise to invest in productive capital such as R&D and human capital, training and up-
skilling etc. because people respond to incentives. 
 
Here is another example to the same effect.  There is more creditable evidence, however, 
that the tax rate is an important explanatory variable of the supply of labour (hours 
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worked).  Labour productivity is pro-cyclical.  During booms, firms hire more workers and 
productivity increases.  Workers make decisions about consumption and leisure and on 
consumption and savings.  The tax rate is the intratemporal factor that affects the supply 
of labour. It distorts the relative prices of consumption and leisure at a point in time.  If 
people expect future taxes on income to increase, they will choose to consume less 
relative to their incomes, and work more (see Nickell (2003), Prescott (2004), and Shimer 
(2009)).  The government has a variety of tax policies, which could influence the firm’s 
decision to invest in productive capital, which affects growth and productivity directly.   
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Table 1 (Equation 12) 
ititgtctitiit vAAAII    ,4,3,21,10 )1(  
Coefficient Estimate P-value 
1   0.57 0.0000 
2   0.06 0.0646 
3   0.15 0.0310 
4  -0.10 0.6228 
Weighted 
2R  0.26  
DW  2.05  
tiI , is sectoral-level investment;  is the difference operator; tiA , is a sector-specific TFP shock; 
tcA , is a country-specific TFP shock; and tgA , is a global TFP shock.  
The regressions include sector-fixed-effect. 
The standard errors are White-cross section corrected. 
Sample is 1988 to 2009, and N=11 industries. 
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Table 2 (Equation 12 with lagged global TFP shocks) 
ititgtctitiit vAAAII    2,4,3,21,10 )1(  
Coefficient Estimate P-value 
1   0.59 0.0000 
2   0.07 0.0447 
3   0.16 0.0236 
4   0.31 0.0000 
Weighted 
2R  0.29  
DW  2.05  
tiI , is sectoral-level investment;  is the difference operator; tiA , is a sector-specific TFP shock; 
tcA , is a country-specific TFP shock; and tgA , is a global TFP shock.  
The regressions include sector-fixed-effect. 
The standard errors are White-cross section corrected. 
Sample is 1988 to 2009, and N=11 industries. 
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Table 3 (Equation 12 with lagged investment vary across industries) 
ititgtctitiiit vAAAII    2,4,3,21,10 )1(  
 
Coefficient Estimate P-value 
2  0.08 0.0170 
3  0.22 0.0000 
4  0.27 0.0012 
i,1 (lagged investments)   
1. Agriculture, forestry, 
fishing 
 0.90 0.0000 
2. Mining   0.66 0.0000 
3. Manufacturing  0.18 0.2433 
4. Electricity, Water and 
Waste Services 
 0.73 0.0014 
5. Constructions  0.54 0.0007 
6. Wholesale Trade  0.12 0.3864 
7. Retail Trade  0.47 0.0042 
8. Accommodation & 
Food Services 
 0.28 0.3340 
9. Transport, Postal & 
Warehousing 
 0.99 0.0000 
10. Information Media & 
Telecom 
 0.41 0.0443 
11. Financial & Insurance 
Services 
 0.62 0.0625 
Weighted 
2R  0.40  
DW  2.05  
tiI , is sectoral-level investment;  is the difference operator; tiA , is a sector-specific TFP shock; 
tcA , is a country-specific TFP shock; and tgA , is a global TFP shock. The regressions include sector-
fixed-effect. The standard errors are White-cross section corrected. Sample is 1988 to 2009, and 
N=11 industries.  The coefficient 1 affects the level positively as shown in 
equation cttt AII   211  . 
 
   1 9   
 
Table 4  (Equation 12 with sector-specific TFP shocks vary across industries) 
ititgtctiitiit vAAAII    2,4,3,,21,10 )1(  
 
Coefficient Estimate P-value 
1   0.56 0.0000 
3   0.13 0.1134 
4   0.32 0.0000 
i2 (Sectoral-level TFP)   
1. Agriculture, 
forestry, fishing 
 0.05 0.5932 
2. Mining   0.09 0.4309 
3. Manufacturing  0.11 0.2693 
4. Electricity, Water 
and Waste 
Services 
-0.11 0.0563 
5. Constructions  0.13 0.0008 
6. Wholesale Trade  0.16 0.1386 
7. Retail Trade  0.37 0.0012 
8. Accommodation & 
Food Services 
 -0.00 0.9972 
9. Transport, Postal & 
Warehousing 
-0.09 0.0285 
10. Information Media 
& Telecom 
 0.50 0.0673 
11. Financial & 
Insurance Services 
 -0.44 0.3182 
Weighted 
2R  0.35  
DW  2.15  
tiI , is sectoral-level investment;  is the difference operator; tiA , is a sector-specific TFP shock; 
tcA , is a country-specific TFP shock; and tgA , is a global TFP shock. The regressions include sector-
fixed-effect. The standard errors are White-cross section corrected. Sample is 1988 to 2009, and 
N=11 industries. 
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Table 5  (Equation 12 with a transitory government spending shock) 
ititctgtctitiit vGAAAII    ,52,4,3,,21,10 )1(  
Coefficient Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value 
1   0.57 0.0000 0.57 0.0000 0.53 0.0000 
2   0.08 0.0280 0.08 0.0433 0.08 0.0248 
3   0.13 0.0380 0.18 0.0088 0.10 0.1382 
4    0.35 0.0000  0.33 0.0000 0.18 0.0193 
5 (i) -0.04 0.1579 - - - - 
5 (ii) - -  0.15 0.1043 - - 
5 (iii) - - - - 0.18 0.0075 
Weighted 
2R   0.31   0.29  0.31  
DW   2.06   2.05  2.06  
tiI , is sectoral-level investment;  is the difference operator; tiA , is a sector-specific TFP shock; 
tcA , is a country-specific TFP shock; and tgA , is a global TFP shock. The regressions include sector-
fixed-effect. The standard errors are White-cross section corrected. Sample is 1988 to 2009, and 
N=11 industries.  
 
i The coefficient corresponds to the measure of government spending shockG , which is 
based on Haver Dataset. 
 
ii The coefficient corresponds to the measure of government spending shockG , which 
includes government purchases only. Source: Claus et al. (2006). 
 
iii The coefficient corresponds to the measure of government spending shockG , which 
includes government purchases plus government investments. Source: Claus et al. (2006). 
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Table 6 (Equation 12 with a Terms of Trade Shock) 
ititctgtctitiit vToTAAAII    ,52,4,3,,21,10 )1(  
Coefficient Estimate P-value Estimate P-value 
1   0.58 0.0000  0.60 0.0000 
2   0.07 0.0487  0.07 0.0432 
3   0.21 0.0172  0.17 0.0272 
4   0.38 0.0000  0.29 0.0000 
5 (i) -0.08 0.1371 - - 
5 (ii) - - -0.009 0.7264 
Weighted 
2R  0.30  0.29  
DW  2.05  2.05  
tiI , is sectoral-level investment;  is the difference operator; tiA , is a sector-specific TFP shock; 
tcA , is a country-specific TFP shock; and tgA , is a global TFP shock. The regressions include sector-
fixed-effect. The standard errors are White-cross section corrected. Sample is 1988 to 2009, and 
N=11 industries.  
 
i  The shock is measured by the cyclical component of the HP filter. 
 
ii  The shock is measured by the residuals of an ARIMA(1,1). 
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Table 7 (Equation 12 with a transitory government spending shock 
which varies across industries) 
itijtcitgtctiitiit vGAAAII    ,,52,4,3,,21,10 )1(  
Coefficient  Estimate P-value 
1    0.44 0.0000 
2     0.07 0.1158 
3     0.13 0.0369 
4     0.17 0.0022 
5  j Lag (Year)   
1. Agriculture, 
forestry, fishing 
1   0.18 0.0435 
2. Mining  1   0.74 0.0589 
3. Manufacturing 2 -0.11 0.0989 
4. Electricity, Water 
and Waste 
Services 
1   0.56 0.0000 
5. Constructions - - - 
6. Wholesale Trade - - - 
7. Retail Trade 0  0.34 0.0419 
8. Accommodation & 
Food Services 
0  0.68 0.0166 
9. Transport, Postal & 
Warehousing 
0  0.37 0.0238 
10. Information Media 
& Telecom 
0  0.36 0.0644 
11. Financial & 
Insurance Services 
- - - 
Weighted 
2R   0.40  
DW   2.10  
Government spending includes government investments. -, denotes insignificant therefore not 
reported. 
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Table 8 (Equation 12 with a ToT shock which varies across industries) 
itijtcitgtctiitiit vToTAAAII    ,,52,4,3,,21,10 )1(  
Coefficient  Estimate P-value 
1    0.55 0.0000 
2    0.07 0.0585 
3    0.16 0.0044 
4    0.22 0.0011 
5  j Lag (Year)   
1. Agriculture, 
forestry, fishing 
1  0.24 0.0823 
2. Mining  0  0.74 0.0143 
3. Manufacturing - - - 
4. Electricity, Water 
and Waste 
Services 
2  0.15 0.0889 
5. Constructions - - - 
6. Wholesale Trade - - - 
7. Retail Trade - - - 
8. Accommodation & 
Food Services 
- - - 
9. Transport, Postal & 
Warehousing 
2  0.14 0.0248 
10. Information Media 
& Telecom 
1 -0.28 0.0336 
11. Financial & 
Insurance Services 
1  0.49 0.0740 
Weighted 
2R   0.36  
DW   2.22  
- Denotes insignificant therefore not reported. 
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Figure 1: Sectoral-Level Log Capital Stock 
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1) Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing; 2) Mining; 3) Manufacturing; 4) Electricity, Water and 
Waste Services; 5) Construction; 6) Wholesale Trade; 7) Retail Trade; 8) Accommodations 
and Food Services; 9) Transport, Postal, and Warehousing; 10) Information, Media and 
Telecommunications; and 11) Financial and Insurance Services. Source: Statistics New 
Zealand. 
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Figure 2:  Sectoral-Level Log Investments 
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1) Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing; 2) Mining; 3) Manufacturing; 4) Electricity, Water and 
Waste Services; 5) Construction; 6) Wholesale Trade; 7) Retail Trade; 8) Accommodations 
and Food Services; 9) Transport, Postal, and Warehousing; 10) Information, Media and 
Telecommunications; and 11) Financial and Insurance Services. Source: Statistics New 
Zealand. 
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Figure 3:  Sectoral-Level TFP Growth Shocks 
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1)  Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing; 2) Mining; 3) Manufacturing; 4) Electricity, Water and 
Waste Services; 5) Construction; 6) Wholesale Trade; 7) Retail Trade; 8) Accommodations 
and Food Services; 9) Transport, Postal, and Warehousing; 10) Information, Media and 
Telecommunications; and 11) Financial and Insurance Services. Source: Statistics New 
Zealand. 
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Figure 4:  New Zealand Average TFP Growth Shock 
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Figure 5:  Global Average TFP Growth Shock 
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Figure 6:  Government Spending Shocks 
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Figure 7:  Terms of Trade Shocks 
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i
 Investment, Productivity and the Cost of Capital: Understanding New Zealand’s Capital 
Shallowness. Treasury Paper 08/3.  
 
ii
  The argument is consistent, for example, with the endogenous growth AK model, which 
assumes that output is given by the following simple production function: ])([ 1   TLKBY , 
where Y is output, K is the stock of capital, and TL is labour-augmented technical progress, 
such as human capital.  It is assumed that workers follow a process of learning-by-doing a la 
Arrow thus: KT  , Which says T is proportional to K , and  is a constant term.  In the 
Arrow model, workers also learn by working with the firms’ capital and from knowledge 
spillover from other firms. Substituting for T in the production function and solve, we arrive 
at: ,)( 1 AKKLBY   hence the AK model, where ALB  )( 1  .  The marginal product of 
capital is AKY  / 0 . Thus, growth is perpetual since the MPK is positive. 
 
iii
  Glick and Rogoff (1995) argue that a country-specific productivity shock can alter 
consumption rather than the complete markets open-economy real business cycle model. 
Baxter and Crucini (1992) show that the two approaches yield similar results for cross-
country correlations unless the degree of persistence of the productivity shock is very high. 
 
iv
  Cassino (2012) is an internal New Zealand Treasury research memo, which illustrates that 
dividing GDP into tradable and non-tradable sectors lacks empirical evidence.  Indeed, take 
housing for example.  It is typically assumed to be a non-tradable goods sector even though 
most, if not all, intermediate inputs into housing are tradable goods.  
 
v
 Glick and Rogoff (1995) do not have depreciation in the capital stock equation.  They say it 
slightly complicates the empirical specification but does not appear to affect the results. 
 
vi
 The assumption is that the marginal utility of consumption and investment is time-invariant 
because country-specific TFP shocks cannot be diversified. 
 
vii
  It is assumed that productivity shocks are homosecedastic and that the variance terms that 
would appear in the second-order approximation are constants. 
  
viii
  The Solow residuals are computed as follows: 6.04.0 ./ ttt HKY ,where tK is the aggregate stock 
of capital, which I approximated using the Perpetual Inventory Method.  I assumed that initial 
stock of capital 0K is three times real GDP, depreciation rate is 8 percent annually, and I 
used Gross Capital formation plus the change in inventory as a proxy for investments. The 
share of capital 0.40 is approximately equal to the average ratio of gross operating surplus / 
GDP ratio over the period 1988-2011. 
 
ix
 It could be argued that certain investments affect productivity as in endogenous growth 
models, hence linear least squares estimates are biased and inconsistent.  An IV estimator 
must be used if the argument is correct.  I do not have adequate instruments to use for such 
regression. The lags are short too.  
 
x
  There is a small but growing literature on this issue.  Countries are becoming interested in 
measuring intangible capital.   See Arato and Yamada (2012) for Japan, a number of papers 
by McGrattan and Prescott (2000, 2004, 2005, 2010, and 2011) for the U.S. for example.  
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xi
 It would possible to estimate a GMM regression if sectoral-level instruments are available, 
but they are not.  One potential instrument might be the growth rate of human capital at the 
sectoral-level.  
 
xii
  According to the theory, permanent and transitory transfers do not affect anything, except 
the distribution of government spending. Permanent and transitory purchases, on the other 
hand, have real but different effects. Permanent purchases work though the wealth effect, 
where higher purchases reduce private wealth because they absorb income and make it 
unavailable to households. They have no interest rate effects, but they increase output by 
increasing hours-worked. People work more to compensate for the decline of wealth. 
Transitory purchases don't change wealth because they don't alter the present value of taxes 
(more accurately, of resource absorption by the government), but they do have intertemporal 
substitution effects for two reasons. First, they directly increase interest rates. Second, they 
change the timing of tax distortion.  A temporary increase in government purchases, 
unmatched by a future temporary increase, has both a permanent component and a 
transitory component, so it has a mixture of the two kinds of effects.  Both permanent and 
transitory changes in transfers have real effects if they involve marginal distortions. If the 
transfers are purely lump sum, they will not have any direct distorting effects, but they will 
have indirect effects if they cause changes in distorting taxes that are used to finance them. 
If the transfers are income-related, then they are themselves a kind of distorting (negative) 
tax and so will have real effects. 
 
xiii
  This is the description of the Claus et al. (2006) data.  “Quarterly aggregate data are collated 
for all variables from June 1982. All fiscal series cover central government with the exception 
of government investment, which also includes local government, because a central 
government investment series is unavailable. The purchase of frigates in 1997 and 1999 are 
removed from both the purchases of government goods and services and the goods and 
services tax (GST) series. Quarterly fiscal data were constructed using two data sources: 
Statistics New Zealand National Accounts Data and the New Zealand Crown Accounts (and 
their supporting financial data). Data on government purchases of goods and services (both 
current and capital) were drawn from the National Account (1993) expenditure GDP series 
for the period June 1987 to date, and were backdated to June 1982 using the National 
Accounts (1968) expenditure GDP series.” 
 
 
